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Civil Society, Democracy, and Peace
Terry Boychuk
Do democratic societies engender democratic states? Or, do dem-
ocratic states engender democratic societies? Are democratic states 
inherently more peaceful than other regimes?
In the 1990s, international agencies invested heavily in building 
up civil society organizations (CSOs) in the developing world as the 
leading edge of a broader campaign to promote democratic transfor-
mations of authoritarian regimes. In the case of Palestine, the intent 
was to establish a democratic social foundation for an emergent politi-
cal entity, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Within a decade, 
much of the original enthusiasm for promoting democratic governance 
through bottom-up initiatives had waned. Optimism for engineering 
democratic cultures from below that would exert pressure upward for 
state-level reforms had given way to more pessimistic assessments of 
the potential for CSOs to induce political change. The dawning wis-
dom was that the political elites of non-democratic states had proven 
themselves quite capable of co-opting burgeoning CSOs into reproduc-
ing existing patterns of governance. The relationship between state 
and civil society seemed circular and self-reinforcing; non-democratic 
polities beget non-democratic civil societies while democratic polities 
beget democratic civil societies.
These perceived lessons of democracy promotion are nonetheless 
highly sensitive to the underlying time frames that serve as the bases 
for reflection. In the short run, it is reasonable to expect that the genera-
tive role of CSOs is largely latent. That is, CSOs can only fulfill their 
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potential as agents of democratization once state-level reforms have 
cleared a path to civic engagement from below, and presumptively, 
such top-down reforms would be exogenous, originating in the inter-
national arena beyond state and civil society. By the same token, politi-
cal elites are likely to keep in check any democratic impulses from civil 
society in the near term, absent external pressures to democratize. In 
the long run, however, the transformative potential of CSOs is more 
likely to become manifest, or take on a life of its own apart from the 
state. Consistent with this perspective, the following analysis stems 
from the premise that democratization is a long-term historical pro-
cess, not a sudden event. Ten years may exceed the life cycle of grants 
from international donor agencies, but in historical time, it does not 
capture the fullness of the alternating cycles of state-society dynamics. 
Nor is democratization a mono-causal process. Multiple, coincidental, 
and mutually reinforcing circumstances produce democratic move-
ments, of which civil society is one element and not the sum and total 
of democratic equations.
Although students of politics often disagree about how to model 
the evolution of democratic governance through the interplay of state 
and civil society, they more frequently share an image of democracy 
as an instrument of peaceful resolution to rival claims to political rule, 
one that generates a pacific aura permeating other realms of social 
life. Nonetheless, historical experience has not demonstrated that civic 
associations, voting rights, and competitive elections are sufficient in 
and of themselves to guarantee social order. The increasingly popular 
adage “No Peace Without Justice” is indicative of evolving doctrines 
about the relationship between democracy and peace. Defining demo-
cratic rule narrowly in terms of formal rights of expression, association, 
and advocacy in the classical liberal tradition (as debates about state 
and civil society in the developing world sometimes do) overlooks the 
profound lessons that have emerged out of the postwar reconstruc-
tion of democratic governance among the advanced industrial nations. 
Modern liberalism has underpinned a long, unprecedented wave of 
domestic prosperity and tranquility. It has done so by enlarging the 
concept of democratic citizenship beyond the rights of individual and 
collective participation in political deliberation. Substantive rights to 
social equality and economic security have become foundations of 
reformed democratic rule, and correspondingly, should inform our 
understanding of the prospects for achieving peace through democra-
tization.
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In the short run, international aid to enlarge the scale and scope of 
civil society organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is both 
necessary and worthwhile. These initiatives, however, are not suffi-
cient to generate democratic and peaceful engagement in the region. 
The development of Palestinian CSOs in the West Bank and Israel 
reveals the pivotal role of state institutions in defining the contours of 
Palestinian civil society. Democratic laws, practices, and procedures 
embedded in the institutions of government do appear to democratize 
civil society as much as patrimonial-authoritarian rule blunts demo-
cratic forms of civic engagement. Consequently, reconciliation efforts 
will require prolonged international support for reforming institutions 
at both levels—renewing investments in Palestinian CSOs as well as 
sustained pressure to institutionalize democratic rights in both Israel 
and Palestine. In the long run, resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict will 
depend on adopting a more expansive definition of democratic rule. 
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that Palestinian CSOs can play 
an enduring role in sustaining democratic governance, provided that 
democratization signifies more than a set of procedures for generating 
and articulating preferences growing out of civil society. Democratic 
co-existence will depend on a commitment to social equality and to 
shared prosperity, not as the outcome of routinized democratic pro-
cesses, but as a precondition of peaceful engagement between Arabs 
and Jews.
This essay develops in three parts. The first provides an empiri-
cally grounded survey of CSOs in the United States. The purpose here 
is two-fold. One is to sidestep much of the theoretical baggage that 
generates exaggerated pessimism about the prospects for democratic 
governance in Palestine specifically, and in the Arab world generally. 
Reigning theories of civil society are more prescriptive than descrip-
tive, more aspirational than operational. The more useful benchmark 
for evaluating civil societies abroad is historical practice in the devel-
oped world, not hypothetical constructs; the former offers a more valid 
measure of the vigor and import of CSOs elsewhere, and the latter, 
a somewhat illusory one. The second is to identify the basic similari-
ties between CSOs in the West and in Palestine. More specifically, the 
branching of civil society into service, advocacy, and political divisions 
observed in Palestine conforms to patterns observed in most nations. It 
is not an aberration.
The second part offers an historical overview of Palestinian CSOs 
in the West Bank and Israel. Comparing the experience of CSOs in 
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these differing contexts provides insight into how political institutions 
shape the development of CSOs. Two critical factors have informed 
the dynamics of Palestinian civil society: the role of transnational and 
international institutions and the immediate realities of democratic or 
colonial rule. Palestinian CSOs in the West Bank and Israel both draw 
extensively on international aid, directed primarily to social service 
and advocacy CSOs. International donors are one of two main pillars 
for CSOs and will likely remain so in the future; the other is govern-
ment funding. In terms of political institutions, Palestinian CSOs in 
Israel and the West Bank both operate within a context of abridged 
civil and political rights. In Israel, Arabs can claim formal democratic 
and civil rights—if not substantive ones—and so Palestinian CSOs in 
Israel are versed in democratic proceduralism with a liberal-pluralist 
bent. In the West Bank, the compromised foundations of PNA rule did 
not augur well for democratization and set the stage for the rise of state 
clientelism and political radicalization that has fragmented Palestinian 
society.
The concluding section considers the prospects for a peaceful reso-
lution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, given the bearings of Palestinian 
CSOs. This discussion stems from two assumptions. The first is that 
the status quo is unsustainable. The international community will 
approach the limits of its tolerance for Israeli colonialism in the fore-
seeable future, and the evident contradictions of military occupation 
will increasingly undermine Zionism as the controlling ethos of the 
Israeli state. The second is that the ongoing transformation of Palestine 
under decades of occupation is foreclosing the possibilities for a Two-
State solution. Short of dismantling the extensive Israeli settlements 
and the military apparatus now ingrained in the territories of the West 
Bank, a reconstructed state unifying Israeli and Palestinian lands rep-
resents the more plausible route to a lasting peace. While the creation 
of a bi-national state faces steep obstacles, the historical experience and 
current achievements of Palestinian CSOs give grounds for cautious 
optimism for arriving at a modus vivendi for an Arab-Jewish state.
*****
In light of current debates about civil society in the United States, 
efforts to promote democracy in the developing world suggest a para-
dox. Western governments’ patronage of civil society organizations in 
the Middle East and elsewhere aims to foster deliberative, representa-
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tive, and politically engaged collectivities. Presumably these CSOs will 
curb the authoritarian tendencies of political leadership in such societ-
ies, and subsequently, engender norms of governance more condu-
cive to the peaceful resolution of domestic and international conflicts. 
However, mounting scholarship on civil society has documented the 
erosion of the very patterns of democratic engagement in the U.S. that 
development agencies and philanthropists imagine cultivating abroad. 
Rather, the contours of civic life in the U.S. indicate points of conver-
gence between American society and those in the developing world, 
notwithstanding U.S. efforts to expand the scale and scope of partici-
patory democracy elsewhere.
As many social scientists have observed, prevailing concepts of civil 
society provide an idealized, not a realistic, description of collective 
mobilization in the U.S. The longstanding importance of membership 
organizations that encompass broad and diverse constituencies has 
largely given way to professionalized, issue-oriented advocacy orga-
nizations divorced from popular influence or participation. Since the 
1960s, upper-middle class, university-educated professionals have 
generally displaced lay leadership of civic organizations. Grants from 
well-endowed philanthropic foundations and wealthy donors, as well 
as contributions raised by direct-marketing fundraising techniques, 
have commonly replaced membership dues and membership volun-
teering as the material fundaments of contemporary political advo-
cacy. Issue-oriented media campaigns, interest group lobbying, and 
public interest litigation are the ascendant modus operandi of post-civil 
rights era CSOs in the U.S. Broad-based social movements bent on 
pressing reform through traditional channels, namely, direct participa-
tion in political parties or electoral campaigns, have waned. Never-
theless, politically active membership organizations have not wholly 
disappeared in the United States. The most successful examples of 
popular, grassroots mobilization in recent times belong to conservative 
Christian organizations. Conservative churches constitute one of the 
few remaining reservoirs of broad-based membership organizations 
available for concerted political action, even though they carry strains 
of ethno-religious nationalism that presents a challenge to secular, lib-
eral-pluralist conceptions of U.S. democracy. The image of a two-tiered 
civil society, one top-down and the other bottom-up, one secular and 
the other religious, one professionalized and the other populist, often 
permeates academic writings about civil society in the U.S.
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A third major branch of civil society in the United States is decid-
edly more apolitical in its leanings. It is comprised of nonprofit orga-
nizations (NPOs) commonly deemed charitable. These are charities that 
deliver education, research, health and other welfare services, among 
other activities held to benefit broad cross-sections of society. For 
charitable NPOs, political partisanship and advocacy are secondary 
to their service mission both in practice and in law. Not only do U.S. 
laws place firm restrictions on their partisan activities, these charities 
have become highly dependent on federal, state, and local govern-
ment financing in the postwar era. Extensive government regulation 
has arrived in tandem with extensive government funding, so much 
so that the autonomy of these organizations—that is, their capacity to 
respond to the communities that they serve as opposed to giving prior-
ity to aligning their activities with government mandates—has been 
commonly exchanged for routinized public financing. It is now pos-
sible to speak of the étatisation of this branch of the nonprofit sector as 
service-oriented charities operate more as extensions of public admin-
istration than as representatives of the citizenry. Some of these charities 
have secular origins. Many have distinctive ethnic, racial, gender, or 
religious affiliations. A great many are affiliated with what are called 
mainline churches, that is, the liberal and moderate wings of Ameri-
can Christianity. Even though charitable NPOs act at the behest of the 
state, government funding sustains highly pluralistic patterns of social 
service provision.
For students and promoters of CSOs in the Arab world, an idealized 
vision of civil society, rather than the mundane realities of the relation-
ship between state and civil society in the West, often becomes the 
benchmark for evaluating progress toward liberalization and democ-
ratization. That service-oriented NPOs are deeply indebted to govern-
ment funding in the Arab world and have not served as rallying points 
for debating government policies and practices is commonly inter-
preted as ingrained patterns of patrimonial rule rather than as striking 
parallels to government-NPO relationships in the U.S. When Western 
governments invest in highly professionalized CSOs in the Arab world 
that espouse secular, liberal, and pluralist values, they often seemed 
puzzled that these organizations do not snowball into broad-based 
social movements for democratic reform, rather than acknowledge 
the identical limits of political advocacy in the West situated upon a 
similarly narrow popular base. That ethnic and religious identities 
often provide the foundation for broad-based political movements is 
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unreflectively dismissed as pathology as such, rather than a similarity 
between U.S. and Arab polities that begs further analysis. The pivotal 
role of ethno-nationalist and religious-based political parties in state 
building in the West seems to have disappeared from the historical 
memory of the political modernizers of the developing world.
Rather than take existing patterns of civil society in the Arab world 
as the incomplete, flawed underpinnings of a democratic order, one 
can identify them as recurring patterns across political regimes. The 
three-fold division of CSOs detailed above encompasses the service, 
advocacy, and political branches of civil society, and it widely obtains 
across time and place. First, service-oriented CSOs are preoccupied 
with the immediate charge of humanizing the social order: relieving 
suffering and want, spreading literacy, propagating cultures of shared 
norms, values, and beliefs, etc. They most commonly do so as ben-
eficiaries of state patronage, but are not generally implicated in risk-
laden contests for political power in any direct sense. They are often 
marbled with diverse class, ethnic, linguistic, and religious solidarities 
and affiliations.
Second, advocacy organizations seek to influence state policy, but 
not to govern. They typically do so as representatives of interested 
minorities that do not command broad-based popular support. Lib-
eral-pluralism is an ideology consistent with their vision of a social 
order of many small fragments. They work to expand the sphere of 
public dialogue and recognition to include a broader representation of 
diverse interests and perspectives.
Third, the political branches of civil society are more directly 
engaged in the struggle for rule. CSOs of this kind generate or channel 
social solidarities broad enough to lay claim to the proximate status 
of governing bloc, partnership in governing coalitions, or legitimate 
opposition to ruling coalitions.
*****
Democracy is an elastic concept, so much so that students of political 
science often attach prefixes and suffixes to the term to give it some 
degree of precision. Every democracy removes basic issues of gover-
nance from democratic deliberation by way of constitution or conven-
tion. Furthermore, these pre-democratic foundations shape the nature 
and scope of civil society. The antecedents of political rule in Israel 
and the Occupied Territories have engendered differing kinds of civil 
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society for Palestinians. Israel has highly developed democratic institu-
tions (although prejudicial in their workings) that have afforded Pales-
tinians the status of a recognized minority. Consequently, Palestinian 
CSOs in Israel have evolved more clearly within a liberal-pluralist 
mold. In the West Bank, military rule and the advent of limited self-
government have frustrated the nationalist ambitions of Palestinians. 
These circumstances have favored the ascendancy of sharply edged, 
ethno-religious CSOs in the Occupied Territories, more devoted to 
resisting Israeli colonialism than to democratic governance.
Israeli democracy is grounded in two competing models of dem-
ocratic governance. Israel is first and foremost an ethno-religious 
nation-state. Secondly, its fundamental laws affirm a commitment to 
liberal-pluralist democracy. The Declaration of the Establishment of 
Israel affirms the creation of a Jewish state, asserting “the natural right 
of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other 
nations, in their own sovereign State,” but also “it will ensure complete 
equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective 
of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, con-
science, language, education and culture.” The a priori commitment to 
upholding Jewish sovereignty is accorded priority in civic and politi-
cal affairs. Nonetheless, the subsidiary commitment to minority rights 
allows Arab-Israelis, who are 20–25% of Israel’s population, to con-
struct an extensive array of CSOs. Palestinian civil society in Israel is 
also bounded by perceived security needs. Israel is a colonizing nation, 
established and consolidated in the face of resistance from Palestine 
and other Arab nations. The state and the Israeli military view indig-
enous Palestinians as a potential fifth column. Therefore, Arab-Israeli 
CSOs are suspended in a state of internal exile, largely insulated from 
associations in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and other Arab nations.
Within the limited parameters granted to Arab-Israeli associations, 
Palestinians have forged a civil society that resembles those of minor-
ity populations in the West in many respects. Service-oriented CSOs 
have proliferated in Israel with the onset of neo-liberal reforms in the 
1980s bent on privatizing public services. Those reforms have success-
fully delegated to NPOs primarily the responsibility for health and 
human services. Palestinian charities are thus integral to the expand-
ing mosaic of ethno-religious and secular welfare agencies underwrit-
ten by abundant government subsidies. Also consistent with the civic 
practices of ethnic and religious minorities in the developed world, Pal-
estinian advocacy organizations pressing for civil rights have grown in 
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importance. Through conventional channels of interest group politics 
(publicity, lobbying, and litigation), Palestinian CSOs have endeavored 
to rein in official discrimination against Arab-Israeli individuals and 
communities. This includes the attempt to stem the abuse of policing 
powers directed against Palestinians arising out of the military’s broad 
jurisdiction over civil matters. Arab representation in the Knesset, like-
wise, has promoted civil rights agendas, but also pressed for Israeli 
recognition of Palestinian sovereignty in the Occupied Territories.
While Palestinian CSOs in Israel have primarily resorted to the 
peaceful avenues of engagement afforded by quasi-democratic insti-
tutions, another salient characteristic of the civic order is the role of 
international alliances. Arab-Israeli NPOs engaged in social service 
provision and advocacy are deeply indebted to international agen-
cies in the West that are devoted to humanitarian aid and supporting 
human rights. Civic associations that bridge Arab and Jewish constitu-
encies are rare or weak. The Zionist leanings of Jewish civic organiza-
tions have more commonly steered Arab-Israeli CSOs into partnerships 
with international agencies to advance minority rights.
Appeals to liberal-pluralistic doctrines of democracy among Pal-
estinian CSOs in Israel differ somewhat from the nationalist aspira-
tions of civil society in the West Bank, as does the historical context of 
rule. During the military occupation of 1967–1993, freedom of political 
expression and association were minimal in the Occupied Territories. 
Political activity was driven underground, operating under the guise 
of cultural and social organizations tolerated by the military authori-
ties because of their seemingly apolitical status. Thus, the charitable, 
advocacy, and political branches of civil society were fused together 
under the rubric of nominally charitable associations. Further, Palestin-
ian CSOs were united in their determination to resist the occupation 
and hasten the arrival of national self-government. The creation of the 
Palestinian National Authority profoundly reconfigured civil society 
in the West Bank. Charitable, advocacy, and political CSOs split apart 
from each other, and they assumed roles of civic engagement more 
typical of their counterparts in Israel and in other democratic states. 
However, the foundations and subsequent evolution of limited home 
rule fragmented Palestinian civic society in ways that did not bode as 
well for democratic governance.
The PNA had conflicting mandates. For the Israeli government, the 
PNA was a client state, fashioned in the interests of Israeli security, 
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and charged with containing radical movements in the Occupied Ter-
ritories. For Europe and the United States, the PNA was to lay the 
groundwork for a democratic state that would evolve toward national 
self-governance and peaceful coexistence with Israel. For Palestin-
ians, the PNA was to deliver the Palestinians from Israeli colonial rule. 
Added to the competing logics of security, democracy, and national 
resistance was the incipient task of assembling the administrative infra-
structure of political governance. The quixotic blueprints of Palestinian 
self-government were bound to disappoint the expectations of the vari-
ous stakeholders in the PNA.
Faced with the liabilities of launching a new state with uncertain 
and conflicting sources of legitimacy, the PNA resorted to patronage to 
consolidate a popular base of support. The charitable branches of Pal-
estinian civil society became increasingly dependent on PNA funding. 
Much of the international aid previously channeled to service-oriented 
CSOs were now routed to, or vetted by, the PNA for redistribution. The 
PNA offered badly needed financial assistance to Palestinian charities 
in exchange for political allegiance to the reigning Fatah party. PNA 
patronage was also systematically denied to rival factions in order to 
appease U.S. and Israeli demands for marginalizing Palestinian orga-
nizations deemed threatening to Israeli security. The institutionaliza-
tion of patron-client relationships between the Fatah-controlled PNA 
and charitable NPOs fueled tensions between the PNA and the second 
branch of civil society, advocacy CSOs. Commonly supported by West-
ern donors, staffed with cadres of university-educated professionals, 
and committed to liberal-secular democratic principles of government, 
advocacy CSOs criticized the PNA for temporizing on democratic 
reforms and for entrenching patrimonial forms of governance. They 
feared that the PNA was institutionalizing corrupt political practices 
that would eventually foreclose the possibility of democratic govern-
ment. Thus, PNA governance drove a wedge between the charitable 
and advocacy branches of Palestinian civil society.
Neither the favor of state-supported CSOs nor the discontent of 
advocacy CSOs with the PNA would arbitrate the fortunes of Pales-
tinian home rule. Popular dissatisfaction with the Oslo Accords and 
its aftermath would ignite a second intifada and fuel support for the 
political branches of Palestinian civil society associated with radical-
ized ethno-religious identities, culminating in the victory of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the January 2006 elections. Patience 
Macalester International  Vol. 23
184
and goodwill toward the PNA have yielded to resentment of a political 
system that has failed to stem Israeli military occupation and settle-
ments in the West Bank. The PNA has not alleviated a deteriorating 
economy nor cleared a genuine path to national sovereignty. The ensu-
ing conflicts between Hamas and Fatah have left the Gaza Strip under 
Hamas control and the West Bank under the internationally supported 
emergency rule of Fatah. Palestinian society remains deeply divided. 
Its political leadership is torn, as the saying goes, “between resistance 
and governance.” The prospects for peace in the region seem as remote 
as ever.
*****
In the short run, international assistance for civil society initiatives in 
Palestine has made no clear impact on resolving the Arab-Israeli con-
flict, which is a major source of political instability in the Middle East 
and the fault line of most East-West tensions in the world. International 
aid for economic, social, and political development in Palestine has 
provided an outlet for Western powers bent on evading the difficult 
issues at stake in the conflict. Yet every incremental gain in peace and 
prosperity attributable to international assistance for Palestinians has 
been annulled by Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories. As many 
observers have argued, international assistance subsidizes the occupa-
tion by minimizing the costs to Israel of providing assistance for the 
majority of Palestinians relegated to abject poverty in the Occupied 
Territories. In this view, aid is now the problem, not the solution, insofar 
as it abets Israeli policies.
There is a growing realization that investments in civic society have 
reached the point of diminishing, vanishing, or even negative returns 
in terms of generating partners for peace on either side of the Arab-
Israeli divide. Yet this opens a window of opportunity to revisit basic 
issues of governance in the region as a way forward. It may be that 
political reform will move to the top of the agenda for international 
stakeholders seeking avenues for a breakthrough to a peaceful settle-
ment. Nonetheless, the options for a lasting and just peace are narrow-
ing. A sovereign, viable Palestinian state may no longer be a credible 
objective.
A bi-national state suggests another way out of the current impasse. 
It is a plausible alternative to the crumbling appeal of Palestinian 
nationalism. Specifically, a bi-national state could liberate an embar-
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goed economy that offers little hope of even modest affluence for the 
mass of pauperized Palestinians, let alone self-sufficiency. It offers 
the prospects of restoring freedom of movement and association for 
a population currently imprisoned in dozens of small, disconnected 
enclaves, and of participating in a state that possesses genuine sover-
eignty. For Israelis, a bi-national state promises relief from longstand-
ing international isolation and condemnation without having to suffer 
the dislocation of uprooting hundreds of thousands of settlers in the 
West Bank or to surrender military control over the Occupied Territo-
ries. It presents an opportunity to end rule over a subject population 
that recreates the very persecution that Jews have suffered elsewhere 
and from which the State of Israel was to provide a safe haven. It 
would lessen vulnerability to hostilities from surrounding states that 
view Israel as an illegitimate entity because of its troubled history of 
not accommodating Palestinian aspirations for political sovereignty.
Do the contours of Palestinian civil society suggest a constructive 
role for CSOs in reaching a prospective settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict through bi-national statehood? There are reasonable grounds 
for concluding that the latent potential of Palestinian civil society could 
become a manifest force for democratic coexistence within the param-
eters of a bi-national state. As detailed above, the service and advocacy 
branches of Palestinian CSOs present few obstacles to—or might even 
facilitate—a reconstructed state. The prevailing tendency to delegate 
direct responsibilities for social provisions to charitable NPOs (with 
extensive government subsidies) could be easily reproduced without 
far-reaching changes under a new dispensation. It would require few 
revisions to sustain current practices. As importantly, it would pro-
vide a solid institutional basis for ethno-religious pluralism within a 
bi-national framework of rule. Many of the divisive issues involved in 
constructing a state-run, assimilationist system of education, health, 
and social welfare services that have rent other nations could be side-
stepped altogether by sustaining emergent practices. The liberal-plu-
ralist ethos of advocacy CSOs in Palestine and Israel, once joined, could 
lend aid and support to democratic engagement and provide a reser-
voir of leadership to reconstituted Arab representation within a new 
political order. As for the political branches of Palestinian civil society, 
the popular basis for bi-nationalism is a largely unexplored issue. A 
broad-based re-examination of the nationalist ambitions is difficult 
within the reigning orthodoxy of the two-state solution, but recon-
structing hard-line versions of both Arab and Jewish national con-
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sciousness remains the most difficult challenge to resolving the current 
impasse. For Arabs, recognizing the permanence of a Jewish presence 
involves surrendering hopes of restoring historical Falastin, including, 
but not limited to, setting aside expectations of reuniting the dispersed 
Palestinian populations now residing in other states throughout the 
region. For Jews, acknowledging the resolute determination of occu-
pied Palestinians to reside in their homeland implies renouncing the 
victory for a state under singular Jewish control, including, but not 
limited to, abandoning the idea of Eretz Yisrael as a potential refuge 
for Jewish communities throughout the world. Each would have to 
compromise its image of ethnocracy for that of peaceful coexistence. 
Both would have to recognize the inescapable reality of their common 
future together, but as equal partners in a shared space.
Ideological barriers to democratic coexistence are not essentially 
intrinsic to the peoples of Israel or Palestine. Ethnically exclusionary, 
all-or-nothing versions of national liberation in the region are not nec-
essarily self-sustaining, especially given that the social costs of main-
taining them apparently far exceed any real benefits, as long as both 
are fully internalized. However, the calculus of compromise or intran-
sigence is not balanced within the limits of domestic resources nor 
uniquely calibrated to the needs or wants of the peoples living within 
Israel-Palestine. It is the externalities of the Arab-Israeli conflict that 
enable, sustain, and exaggerate triumphalist nationalism, with the 
balance weighted heavily in Israel’s favor. The missing partner for 
peace—the one that tilts the costs and benefits of Arab-Israeli encoun-
ters in favor of continued aggression and against compromise—resides 
elsewhere.
On the Arab-Israeli question, “The United States holds all the cards,” 
as the saying goes. International deference to American interventions 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the wider Middle East means that the 
opportunity for peaceful reconstruction of the region depends on the 
currents of U.S. politics and the evolution of American foreign policy. 
Israeli national ambitions expanded during the Cold War only with 
the aid and support of the U.S. government. The generously rewarded 
ally against Soviet influence in the region has now become the richly 
endowed ally in the global war against terrorism. Absent a dramatic 
reconsideration of American strategic aims—from one of forcible paci-
fication of the region to that of bridging and reconciling Western and 
Middle Eastern civilizations—Israeli nationalism will follow a similar 
course. U.S.-Israeli ambitions are self-evidently expensive and onerous 
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and ultimately self-defeating in the long run. If the U.S. realizes this 
sooner rather than later, and reprises an awareness of the origins of its 
own success in sustaining domestic peace and order, it could unilater-
ally reframe the terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict and hand the moder-
ates on both sides a long awaited victory. •
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